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Abstract 
This paper investigates the state, development and drivers of banking market 
integration in the member countries of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) by employing interest rate data. We first conduct a principal 
component analysis and find evidence for both increasing monetary integration and 
banking integration in loan and deposit markets. These integration processes are not 
developing uniformly and we can identify a convergence club. As banking market 
integration can be a genuine process or simply be driven by monetary integration, we 
also investigate the interest rate pass through from national and South African 
Central bank interest rates onto national retail rates. With respect to the convergence 
club we find both, genuine and monetary-integration driven processes though the 
latter dominate. We conclude that a selective expansion of the Common Monetary 
Area is possible but needs to be complement by efficient financial development 
policies. 
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1. Introduction 
Economic and financial integration ranks high on the policy makers’ agenda in Africa 
(Tsangarides and Qureshi, 2008). One of the prominent regional integration initiatives1 is the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC). SADC has traditionally focused on 
trade and structural policies but has recently announced to aim at monetary unification by 
the year 2016 (Rossouw, 2006). It comprises such diverse countries as Angola, Botswana, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe of which only four, namely South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Namibia 
already form a Common Monetary Area (CMA). Most studies on the viability of this vision 
concentrate either on optimum currency area (OCA) considerations or macro-economic 
(nominal) convergence (see Jenkins and Thomas, 1998; McCarthy, 2002; Khamfula and 
Huizinga, 2004; Kabundi and Loots, 2007; Rossouw 2006). In contrast and as a complement 
to these exercises our study concentrates on the state and potential development of monetary 
and financial integration across SADC countries. In choosing this point of view we also 
implicitly acknowledge the new strand of literature on endogenous OCAs which start with 
Rose (2001) and hypothesize a potentially large positive effect of a common currency on 
trade. We investigate rigorously the current state and underlying causes of banking market 
integration among SADC countries by bringing together two strands of the empirical 
financial integration literature, principal component analysis (PCA) and interest rate pass-
through (PT) analysis, with a view on deriving policy conclusions on the readiness of 
countries for joining a monetary area or union based on monetary and financial integration 
criteria. 
                                                 
1  Most of the regional alliances are focusing on common economic and trade policies, such as the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), whereas the 14 member countries of the African Financial Community 
(CFA) form two monetary unions, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) 
and the Central African Economics and Monetary Community (CEMAC) with a single central bank 
in each union and a single currency or peg to the French franc/euro, respectively. 
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Financial integration can be measured in various ways. A prominent classification 
distinguishes quantity-based, price-based and news-based measures (Baele et al., 2004). 
Quantity-based measures focus on cross-border transactions, such as cross-border loans and 
deposit taking or cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). As such data are either 
notoriously unreliable or unavailable for SADC countries, price-based measures, in our case 
interest rates, are preferable. Price-based measures of integration regularly use the law of 
one price (LOOP) as the point of reference (Adam et al., 2002) and thus investigate price 
convergence. In the case of financial integration, the relevant parity conditions are interest 
rate parity conditions. A LOOP-based point of view is acceptable when analyzing 
homogeneous assets but is questionable for heterogeneous assets that characterize retail 
banking markets. In the European context Kleimeier and Sander (2000) therefore advocate 
to investigate co-movements rather than convergence of retail interest rates. While in a 
structurally stable environment this can be done by means of cointegration analysis, for 
SADC countries it is more appropriate to analyze co-movements of interest rates without 
expecting to find stable long-term relationships. In order to investigate monetary and 
banking market integration in SADC, we therefore apply PCA to central bank (monetary 
policy) interest rates, deposit and loan interest rates, respectively. The PCA allows us to 
identify sub-groups of countries for which interest rates move in the same direction. More 
specifically, we consider a (sub-) group of countries to be integrated when their interest rates 
are driven by one common principal component.  When interpreting the results of the PCA, 
the special role of the central bank in the banking market must be considered. Here, the 
European experience has made clear that in the presence of integrated money market rates or 
monetary policy rates, co-movements of retail interest rates can easily be misread as sign of 
an integrated banking market (Kleimeier and Sander, 2007). If central bank rates move 
together and monetary policy rates are transmitted to retail rates in a uniform way in the 
various countries, then the banking market appears integrated. Therefore an analysis of the 
national interest rate PT should complement PCA. This news-based measure thus reports 
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how similar the banking markets in the investigated countries respond to monetary policy 
news. 
 In this study we contribute to the literature by focusing on the state of and potential 
for financial integration in SADC with special reference to banking market integration. The 
existing empirical evidence focuses either on measuring integration or on measuring the PT, 
but no study has brought both elements together. This is where our contribution lies. First, 
we investigate monetary and banking market integration using PCA. By applying PCA to 
different time periods, i.e. rolling time windows, we document the progress and 
development of financial integration over time. Second, we look at the driving forces of 
banking market integration and single out the role of an efficient PT of national monetary 
policy onto bank interest rates or – if applicable – the role of a common or dominant 
monetary policy. The latter is explored by investigating directly the PT from South African 
to domestic banking rates. Our findings indicate that the degree of financial integration is 
increasing in some but not all countries. While banking market integration is predominantly 
driven by monetary integration, a genuine banking market integration process is also 
observable in some countries. However, even this integration process is concentrated on a 
“convergence club” with CMA in its centre. Our analysis indicates that a few non-CMA 
SADC countries may become potential candidates for a CMA enlargement, while many 
others are still far away from being judged as candidates from a pure financial integration 
point of view.  
 The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the state of banking market 
integration in Southern Africa as it is documented in the literature. Section 3 describes data 
and methodologies used. Section 4 reports the results and Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Financial Development and Integration in SADC: Stylized facts and literature review 
 SADC comprises 15 countries2 which differ widely in terms of development, 
macroeconomic stability, monetary and financial development and real and financial 
integration. Of these countries four are currently member of the CMA and are thus operating 
under a fixed exchange rate systems with the South African rand as anchor currency. 
Botswana, that together with the four CMA countries forms the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU), has an independent exchange rate system but is indirectly linked to the rand 
through a currency basket in which the rand accounts for 60 to 70%. The other 10 countries 
(OTHER) are following largely differing exchange rate regimes.3 Table 1 give an overview 
of the development of some important real and financial development indicators of the 
individual SADC countries as well as the GDP-weighted averages for all SADC countries 
and the subgroups CMA, SACU and OTHER. As expected, CMA shows the highest degree 
of macroeconomic convergence, especially with respect to inflation. Botswana’s 
characteristics are in a similar range but the diversity is much higher in the OTHER 
countries. Comparing SADC’s achievements with respect to the Maastricht criteria for 
convergence and thus membership in the European Monetary Union (EMU), Rossouw 
(2006) argues that “the challenges facing a SADC monetary union would not be 
insurmountable if the convergence criteria are viewed as permanent goals, rather than 
preconditions.” In contrast, Khamfula and Huizinga (2004) and Buigut and Valev (2006) are 
less optimistic. While the former conclude that “a monetary union that embraces all SADC 
members would amass large costs relative to the benefits and hence would not be desirable”, 
the latter point to South Africa’s resistance to a CMA expansion and conclude that the CMA 
could easiest be expanded by Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
                                                 
2  Seychelles was a member of SADC from 1997 to 2004, when it pulled out of the arrangement, but 
has since then started negotiations to rejoin. Hence in the analysis it is treated as a SADC member. 
3 For a summary of exchange rate systems, exchange control restrictions on current and capital 
account transactions in SADC countries, see Table A-1 in the appendix. 
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 Looking at financial development reflected by the spread of lending over deposit 
rates as an indicator of banking market efficiency and financial deepening indicators such as 
credit to GDP and deposits to GDP clearly shows the enormous diversity in financial 
development as well as the well-documented financial underdevelopment in many SADC 
countries. Clearly, South Africa and Namibia have the most developed banking markets 
along with non-CMA member Mauritius. Moreover these measures improve slightly over 
time. Financial development is also taking place in the remaining countries but is still at a 
very low level. Not much progress is being made in the latter group with respect to the 
spreads. To the contrary, this efficiency measure shows improvement in only very few 
countries and is still particularly high in the OTHER countries. 
 Given the strong differences in financial intermediation, bank interest rates and 
spreads several questions arise when capital movements are not (fully) restricted4: Are 
arbitrage processes taking place across SADC banking markets? To what extent are these 
processes already effective in integrating SADC banking markets? If retail banking rate are 
in fact co-moving, to what extent is this being mediated through co-movements of monetary 
policy-determined interest rates?  
 The existing empirical studies on interest rates in Southern Africa focus either on 
measuring integration by interest rate co-movement (Aziakpono, 2006 and 2008; Nielsen et 
al., 2005) or on measuring the PT (Sander and Kleimeier, 2006). Aziakpono (2008) and 
Nielsen et al. (2005) investigate the behaviour of national interest rates by using the interest 
rate parity as an indicator of integration. Aziakpono’s (2008) findings reveal a high level of 
dependence of the other SACU countries’ financial systems on South Africa’s and he thus 
concludes that a monetary unification with a single central bank (South African Reserve 
Bank) and monetary policy for the union is feasible. However, the success of such a 
monetary union will critically depend on the efficiency gains of the domestic financial 
system.  Such  gains are  country-specific. For  countries  such as  Botswana,  Lesotho  and 
                                                 
4   For country details on restrictions on capital account transaction see Table A-1 in the appendix. 
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Swaziland with relatively weak domestic monetary policy transmission, a significant 
improvement in their monetary transmission can be expected. However, in Namibia, where 
the domestic policy seems to be more effective, a single central bank may actually lower the 
speed of the monetary transmission process. These findings are in line with Nielsen et al. 
(2005) who use the uncovered interest rate parity to assess the level of financial integration 
within the CMA plus Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Using both rolling unit root tests 
and a moving regression that enable them to examine the degree of financial integration over 
time, they find that Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland are well financially integrated with 
South African market while the other countries are not. Regarding South Africa’s special 
role Aziakpono (2006) formulates and tests the South African dominance hypothesis 
(SADH) and the possibility of arbitrage activities within the SACU countries using interest 
rates PT. The SADH relates to the extent to which monetary policy stance in South Africa is 
passed through to and reflected in the monetary policy of the other countries while interest 
rate parity arising from profit-seeking capital flows is regarded as evidences of arbitrage 
activities. His findings support the SADH and reveal a hierarchy of financial integration with 
South Africa ranging from highly-integrated Namibia and Swaziland to less-integrated 
Lesotho and least-integrated Botswana. The results further suggest policy convergence, 
rather than market convergence (arbitrage activities), as the main driver of integration. In a 
related study, Sander and Kleimeier (2006) find a rather homogeneous PT process for 
lending rates and a less homogeneous one for deposit rates. Again South African interest 
rates play an important role in the determination of national discount rates, T-bill rates as 
well as commercial bank interest rates. They thus confirm the finding of Aziakpono (2006) 
and the validity of the SADH. While existing studies focus on the CMA or SACU countries, 
with exception of Nielsen et al. (2005) who included Zambia and Zimbabwe, none of them 
has investigated the extent of integration and the SADH across the entire set of SADC 
countries. As such, our study is also the first to provide directly comparable evidence for all 
SADC countries.  
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data  
We investigate the integration of central bank and retail banking markets by 
analyzing the interest rates that are charged in these markets. We therefore collect monthly 
interest rate series for all 15 SADC countries from the International Financial Statistics 
(IFS). We use discount rates provided in IFS series 60 as central bank rates, prime lending 
rates of series 60P as lending rates, and series 60L as deposit rates. In general, our sample 
extends from January 1990 to December 2005 but several series have missing values.5   
As the economic environment in Southern Africa is rather volatile, we have to 
define an appropriate time horizon for our analysis. On the one hand, a shorter sample period 
will better reflect changes that occur in the banking markets. On the other hand, a longer 
sample period will provide statistically sounder results. To balance these two aspects, we opt 
for rolling sample periods of five years (60 observations) each. We can thus analyze 12 
samples from January 1990 to December 1994, January 1991 to December 1995, and so on 
until January 2001 to December 2005. While sufficiently long for statistical analyses, the 
rolling nature of the sample periods should reveal any changes in integration over time.  
Figure 1 gives a first impression of the development of interest rate dispersion over 
time in four regions of CMA, SACU, SADC and our final group of OTHER countries which 
includes all SADC countries that are not SACU members. The coefficient of variation – 
defined as the standard deviation of all regional interest rates divided by their mean – reveals 
that interest rates are more homogenous in CMA and SACU. Due to the exchange rate union 
among CMA countries and – to lesser extent – to Botswana, this result is not surprising. 
Taking the region as a whole, the degree of dispersion starts to increase in late 2003. While 
this increase occurs simultaneously for retail rates and central bank rates in the non-SACU 
countries, lending rate dispersion does not increase in the CMA.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
                                                 
5  Details are available in Table A-2 in the working paper version of this study. 
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3.2. Methodology 
The developments of interest rate dispersion in SADC countries suggest two 
avenues for subsequent investigation. First, we will scrutinize the development and extent of 
integration of both central bank and retail interest rates by means of a PCA. As Figure 1 
clearly illustrates, the integration (or disintegration) process of retail banking can be 
dominated by monetary integration as it could be inferred from the recent developments of 
the non-SACU OTHER countries. Looking however at CMA and – to a much lesser extent 
at SACU – banking markets may also lead the process. Thus, and secondly, we will 
investigate the driving forces of banking market integration. If monetary integration is the 
driver, then it requires that in the process of monetary integration the PT from central bank 
rates to retail interest rates will not become more heterogeneous. If the PT remains 
unchanged, the developments in banking markets are simply following monetary integration. 
If the PT becomes more homogeneous under increasing monetary integration – or more 
heterogeneous under monetary disintegration – this would reflect more banking market 
integration. The latter can happen particularly in times where banking interest rates follow 
the national central bank rates to a lesser degree than before and instead orient themselves 
more to central bank rates of a dominant foreign monetary policy. Thus we conduct a PT 
analysis in order to reveal the driving forces of banking market integration, particularly the 
role of an efficient PT of national monetary policy onto bank interest rates and the role of a 
common or dominant monetary policy. With respect to SADH this means that when the 
South African Reserve Bank has a direct and unidirectional impact on monetary policy rates 
in other country and an efficient PT exists in South Africa and the respective other country, 
then the banking markets also appear to be integrated by means of monetary policy 
convergence rather than a genuine banking market convergence which could also be 
dominated by South African markets. A third version of the SADH could envisage a direct 
impact of South African monetary policy rates on bank interest rates in third countries even 
without monetary integration when banks orient their pricing policy to South African policy 
rates. 
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3.2.1. Principal component analysis 
PCA has it roots in the analyses of financial integration based on interest rate levels. 
These generally follow one of two approaches. The first was introduced by Cooper (1971) 
who examines the degree of divergence of interest rates across countries based on their 
standard deviation. According to this approach, the lower the standard deviation of yields on 
similar assets the higher the degree of financial integration; whereas if the standard deviation 
is high, then the level of integration is low (Nellis, 1982). The second approach popularized 
by Logue et al. (1976) focuses on the covariability of interest rates and does not require 
similarity of interest rate levels. Here, the degree of financial integration will be high if the 
covariability of interest rates and their changes is high despite the fact that interest rate levels 
may differ substantially. As Figure 1 shows, this is the case for SADC countries and we thus 
follow this second approach and assess the covariability of interest rates using PCA.6  
 The aim of PCA is to obtain a small number of uncorrelated factors, called principal 
components (PCs) that best account for the correlation among the interest rates in the 
different countries. Let X represents a vector of interest rates in the CMA countries. PCA 
detects banking market integration by converting a matrix of these rates into a linear 
combination of unobserved PCs, which explain the complete variance of these interest rates. 
The PC problem can thus be expressed as 
AXP = (1) 
where P is a vector of orthogonal factors or PCs which are a linear combination of the 
original interest rate series X. X describes the m observed sets of interest rates variables and 
A is a matrix of coefficients, called factor loadings, with each coefficient representing the 
weight of the corresponding original variable in the relevant PC. The number of PCs is equal 
to the number of the original variables. However, the PCs are orthogonal, i.e. independent of 
each other. The PCA derives the PCs in such a way that they explain the variations in the set 
of original variables in a descending order. Thus, the first PC accounts for the main part of 
                                                 
6  Next to the contribution to the understanding of Southern African banking markets, our study is 
thus also contributing to the growing literature which assesses regional integration based on PCA 
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the variation in X; the second PC will explain the main part of the remaining variations in X 
after the effects of the first PC has been removed.7 If banking markets are integrated, the 
correlation structure of the interest rates would be best described by one common factor 
explaining their long run behaviour. But if banking markets are not integrated, there will be 
more than one PC needed to explain the interrelations between bank interest rates. 
 In order to determine the explanatory power of each PC, two measures are 
conventionally used: eigenvalue and cumulative R2. To determine the significance of a PC 
we apply the Kaiser rule of eigenvalue greater or equal to 1 (Kaiser, 1960).8 Next, to 
determine the relative contribution of each country’s interest rate to the significant PCs, we 
used the factor loadings of the PCs. Note that the signs of the loadings are completely 
arbitrary (Jolliffe, 2002:67). However, the pattern of variation of the signs from one factor 
loading to the other can be used to determine the co-movement of the variables. In the 
context of our analysis, a largely random factor loading (with differing signs and sizes) 
implies that the interest rates move largely independently of each other, hence indicating low 
integration. The more systematic (same sign and size) the loadings, the greater the degree of 
integration (Becker and Hall, 2008). In addition, the pattern exhibited by a group of 
countries can be used to determine a convergence group, i.e. countries that move in the same 
direction (having the same sign in the same PC). Even though PCA is a static analysis, in 
this paper, following Gilmore et al. (2008), we tailored it to a dynamic analysis to examine 
the progress and development of banking market integration over time. This is accomplished 
by estimating the models for rolling time windows of five years each and then graphically 
plotting the eigenvalues.  
                                                                                                                                          
(Perignon et al., 2007; Becker and Hall, 2008; Gilmore et al., 2008; Figueira et al., 2005; 
Siliverstovs et al., 2005; Fernandez-Izquierdo and Lafuente, 2004; Nellis, 1982). 
7  Note that the PCA makes no assumptions about the underlying properties of the data series X. Thus 
there is no need for instance to determine the stationarity properties of each series. 
8  For a discussion of weaknesses and alternative rules see Jolliffe (2002:112-131). For applications 
see for instance Nellis (1982), Figueira et al. (2005) and Meric et al. (2008). 
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3.2.2.  Empirical pass-through analysis  
The PT methodology is closely based on Sander and Kleimeier (2004, 2006) who 
model the PT as the following vector autoregressive (VAR) process: 
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where CBRt is the central bank rate and RRt represents the commercial banks’ retail rate 
which can be either a lending rate (LR) or a deposit rate (DR). The optimal lag length is 
indicated by k* and n*, respectively, and determined according to the AIC criterion over all 
combinations of lags up to a lag length of 4. Based on this representation of the PT process, 
the responsiveness of RRs to CBRs can be measured over various time horizons. The impact 
multiplier, as given by the coefficient β1, measures the immediate adjustment within the 
current month. Here a value of β1<1 indicates sluggish adjustment, also known as interest 
rate stickiness. At the other end of the time horizon, the long-term multiplier can be 
calculated from (2) as  
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In the long run equation (2) therefore has the form of  
ttt uCBRRR ++= θθ0 (4) 
If θ=1, we speak of a full PT in the long run. Switching costs, information asymmetries, not 
fully elastic credit demand functions, imperfect competition and other market imperfections 
can cause an imperfect PT, in which case we will find θ<1. θ>1 can represent times when 
banks do not ration credit supply but increase lending rates to compensate for higher risks. 
As is common for interest rate time series, the CBRs and RRs used in this study 
exhibit an I(1) property – that is, they are non-stationary series that do not return to any 
mean value and that have with time increasing variances.9 In this case, PT models like 
                                                 
9  In contrast, I(0) or stationary series have a limited variance and fluctuate around their mean. By 
differentiating an I(1) series, a I(0) series is obtained. We employ various tests to establish whether 
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equation (2) are regularly estimated in first differences to avoid spurious regression 
problems: 
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It should be noted that by doing so, important information about the long-run relationship is 
lost. Equation (2) can, however, be estimated directly and will contain the long-run 
information if both interest rates are cointegrated in the sense of Engle and Granger (1987).10 
The deviation from the long-run equilibrium will then be measured by the estimated error ut 
from equation (4) and included in the PT model as a lagged error correction term (ECT). 
Thus, a proper PT measurement should be based on an error correction model (ECM) that 
explicitly incorporates the long-run relationship between RRs and CBRs provided the series 
are cointegrated:  
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As motivated above, we investigate not only the effects of domestic monetary policy 
but also the impact of the South African monetary policy on national retail banking rates. In 
CMA, commercial banks adjust their lending and deposit rates to a common monetary 
policy rate and may even adjust more directly to changes of the South African than to 
national policy rate. Beyond more or less fixed pegs to the rand, a significant response of 
retail rates to South African central banks rates is of course much less likely. For CMA 
                                                                                                                                          
or not the interest rate series used in this study are non-stationary. For each of the rolling sample 
periods, we conduct ADF and DG-GLS unit root tests. For the full period, we additionally estimate 
mean-shift, trend-shift and recursive unit root tests which are valid even in the presence of a 
structural break (see Banerjee, Lumsdaine, and Stock, 1992). Results can be found in working 
paper version of this paper. Our tests indicate that the series are I(1) but there are a few exceptions. 
As we however do not encounter cases where both the CBR and the RR are I(0), we always 
estimate the PT in first differences. 
10 We employ two types of tests in order to determine whether on not CBR and RR are cointegrated. 
First, we estimate the usual Durbin-Watson (DW), Dickey-Fuller (DF) and augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) tests. Cointegration is considered to exist if at least two test statistics are significant at 
10% level or 1 test statistic at 5% level. Second, we follow Kremers, Ericsson and Dolado (1992) 
and consider cointegration to exist when the coefficient of the lagged error correction term (ECTt-1) 
is significant at the 5% level in equation (6). If one of both of these test procedures indicates 
cointegration, we estimate the PT as (6). Only if both of these test procedures reject cointegration is 
the PT estimated as (5). To avoid switching too frequently between these two PT models, i.e. for 
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countries we thus expect β1 and θ in a model with South African CBRs to be non- zero and 
possibly larger than in a model with national CBRs. Imagine, however, that banking markets 
are fully integrated in the absence of monetary integration while capital mobility is given 
only in retail banking. Consider under such conditions an increase in the South African 
central bank rate that also increases deposit rates. With an integrated banking market this 
would lead to cross-border arbitrage and eventually to higher deposit rates in the other 
countries. This effect manifests itself in our PT model when for a non-CMA country β1 and 
θ are relatively large in response to South African CBRs and relatively small in response to 
national CBRs. Hence, the existence of a PT from the South African policy rate to other 
countries’ national banking market rates can be interpreted as evidence for banking market 
integration when no monetary integration is found. Thus, the PT analysis is an important 
complement to the PCA. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Banking market integration: Evidence from principal component analyses 
Tables 2 and 3 as well as Figure 2 summarize the PCA results.11 Table 2 reports the 
cumulative R2 of the first PC, while Figure 2 and plots the eigenvalues of the PCs of the first 
PC. The results are reported by regional group as well as by interest rate. Table 3 reports the 
summary results of the convergence group analysis based on the factor loadings of 
significant PCs for the period 2000 to 2005 when there was greater evidence of banking 
integration in the SADC region. Overall, the results confirm our expectation that CMA 
banking markets are the most integrated followed by the SACU countries. With the 
exception of deposit markets, the OTHER countries are more integrated than SADC as a 
whole. There is also some evidence to suggest that the level of integration increases over 
time for each region and interest rate.   
                                                                                                                                          
our overlapping sample periods, exceptions are made for single periods. Details can be found in 
working paper version of this paper. 
11 Additional results of the PCA can be found in Figure 3 and Table 2 in the working paper version. 
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
4.1.1. CMA 
In the CMA with the exception of 1996-2000 rolling period for the central bank rate, 
in all the rolling windows there is only one significant PC. The cumulative R2 reported in 
Table 2 also confirm this. In all the cases, the first PC has a high explanatory power, 
explaining on average 82%, 87% and 86% of the variations in central bank, deposit and 
lending rates, respectively. Both retail rates exhibit stronger evidence of convergence and 
integration than the central bank rate. As evident from the graphical plot of the eigenvalues 
of the first PC in Figure 2 and the R2 in Table 2, the level of banking market integration 
among the CMA countries is relatively stable over time, only the R2 show some 
improvement except for the second half of the 1990s (1995-1999 and 1996-2000 rolling 
periods). The possible reasons for the slight drop in the degree of banking market integration 
during the 2nd half of the 1990s become apparent if one examines the factor loading for the 
CMA12. The factor loading of the first PC show that all countries move in the same direction 
as can be expected due to the CMA agreement. However, the coefficients for Lesotho are 
lower, implying that this country weighs less in the integration of the region. This effect is 
particularly manifest in the central bank rate, which in addition to being significantly lower, 
actually moves in the opposite direction during 1996-2000 rolling period. However, the 
trend changes with the 1997-2001 rolling period. The events in Lesotho lend support to the 
results. From the mid-1990s, the financial system in Lesotho experienced considerable 
distress which was mainly due to poor management, irresponsible lending and political 
interference in banking operations. This culminated in the liquidation of the Lesotho 
Agricultural Development Bank (the country’s second largest bank) in 2000 and the Lesotho 
Bank (the country’s largest bank) in 2001, despite several rescue attempts by the 
government. In August and September 1998, Lesotho was furthermore engulfed in a political 
crisis that led to destruction of property, heavy stock looting and burning of several 
                                                 
12 See Figure 3 in the working paper version for results of the factor loading. 
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companies. The uncertainty created by the crisis resulted in an additional decline in domestic 
banking activities (Aziakpono, 2004).  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
4.1.2. SACU 
As expected, the banking markets in the SACU countries are also highly integrated 
though to a lesser extent than the CMA countries. In most rolling periods, one significant PC 
is found. The explanatory powers of these first PCs are quite high, averaging 73.7%, 74.8% 
and 75.3% for central bank, deposit and lending rates, respectively. Again, the retail bank 
rates show stronger evidence of convergence. The level of banking market integration 
however varies slightly over time. Similar to the CMA countries, SACU’s banking markets 
experience the least integration during the second half of the 1990s, especially during 1995-
1999. During 1997-2001 and 1998-2002, banking markets and here especially the retail 
markets experienced an unprecedented level of integration but dropped again during 1999-
2003, and thereafter begin to rise.  
An examination of the coefficients of the first PC reveals the relative contributions 
of each country’s market to the observed integration patterns. The pattern of movement of 
the CMA countries within SACU remains the same as observed when analyzing the CMA 
region alone. However, Botswana moves in a consistent manner in all the periods and 
independently of the rest of the SACU countries for most of the rolling periods and 
irrespective of the interest rates used. It is striking that for all the instances where the 
markets moved in harmony (2000-2004 and 2001-2005 for all interest rates and 1994-1998 
for lending rates), the CMA countries converge towards Botswana and not the opposite. It is 
not quite evident what is responsible for the pattern during the 1994-1998 rolling period. 
One possible explanation might be the change in the political dispensation in South Africa in 
1994 resulting in a friendlier relationship with Botswana, which hitherto maintained a strong 
opposition to South Africa. The concomitant relaxation of the political tension between the 
two countries might have manifested itself in the synchronization of their banking credit 
markets.  
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The pattern since 2000 can be explained by two possible factors. First, in February 
1999 Botswana adopted a more liberal foreign exchange policy by abolishing the exchange 
control and adopting full capital account convertibility.13 This policy action which signalled 
a move towards openness of the financial system might have contributed to the 
synchronization of interest rates. However, given the fact that the factor loadings for 
Botswana for all the interest rates maintain a consistent pattern over time, the change in 
policy stance in 1999 may not have been the major driver of the synchronization of interest 
rates with those of the CMA countries. Hence, in our view, a second factor may be the major 
driver: In 2000, South Africa adopted an inflation targeting monetary policy framework 
which resulted in a drop in both inflation rate and market interest rates (and of course the 
other CMA countries followed). Importantly, this brought stability to the market interest 
rates relative to the past, resulting in rates which were more in harmony with Botswana’s 
stable and lower interest rates.  
4.1.3. OTHER and SADC 
The none-SACU members of the SADC constitute the OTHER region. As expected 
the level of banking market integration is relatively low compared to SACU. However, 
unlike CMA and SACU where the retail bank rates lead the integration process, in OTHER 
countries the central bank rates lead the integration process followed by lending rates. With 
an average of 55.4%, 45.4% and 51.7% for central bank, deposit and lending rates, 
respectively, the explanatory power of the first PC is low. Likewise, there are mostly two or 
more significant PCs. It is also evident that the degree of banking market integration 
increases during the last two rolling periods for all interest rates. The factor loadings are very 
random except in the last two rolling periods when they tend to exhibit a more systematic 
pattern. Finally, the results for the entire SADC region are quite similar to OTHER. It is also 
evident that in recent years, particularly since 2000, the degree of banking market integration 
increases. 
                                                 
13 See Table A-1 in the appendix for a summary of the prevailing exchange rate systems. 
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4.1.4. Convergence Club in the SADC region: 2000 - 2005 
We subject the entire SADC region to further analysis focusing on the period 
between 2000 and 2005 where there is evidence of growing integration. Our aim is to sort 
the countries into groups that are becoming integrated based on the similarities of their 
movements. Since our earlier analyses show that the CMA countries are highly integrated 
we will pay attention to those countries of the SADC that are converging to the CMA 
countries which can together form part of an expanded CMA. Hence, the analysis will shed 
light on the prospect for a SADC-wide monetary union. If the banking markets in most 
countries are already converging to the CMA countries, the prospect of monetary union is 
high, otherwise much work will still need to be done. The estimation is carried out for each 
of the three interest rates but we retain only the significant PCs for analysis. Countries with 
high factor loadings and with the same sign in the same PC are regarded as moving together 
and are thus grouped together. Following an iterative approach suggested by Jolliffe (2002), 
we subject such a group to further analysis. If the countries in the group are truly integrated, 
a further PCA should produce only one significant PC. If not, the process continues until we 
obtain a single dominant PC that explains most of the variation in the interest rates. The 
results are reported in detail in Table 3. For each of our three interest rates, we report the 
eigenvalues and cumulative R2 for the full sample and the groups. Likewise, the factor 
loading of the first PC for the full sample and the groups are reported. For groups where a 
factor loading is reported without eigenvalue and cumulative R2, such a factor loading is 
obtained from the other significant PCs of the full sample.  
The results for the central bank rates of 12 countries are shown in Panel A of Table 
3. The eigenvalues reveal that there are three significant PCs explaining about 86% of the 
variation in central bank rates, while the first PC (PC#1) alone explains 61%. Looking at the 
factor loadings of PC#1 in the full sample, one can easily identify seven countries with high 
coefficients and equal signs. These seven countries constitute Group 1. Further estimation 
produces only one significant PC, which explains 79% of the variations in the central bank 
rates. Though Zambia appears to have a high coefficient with the same sign as the other 
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seven countries in PC#1, its coefficient also dominates the third PC (PC#3) of the full 
sample. In addition, when Zambia’s central bank rate is included in Group 1, two significant 
PCs are found. Hence, Zambia is excluded from Group 1. Though the factor loading for 
Botswana in PC#1 moves in the same direction as those of the countries in group 1, its 
coefficient dominates the second PC. When adding Botswana’s central bank rate to Group 1, 
two significant PCs are found. Hence, Botswana is removed from Group 1. In the 
subsequent PCA, though factor loadings for Botswana are highest, the factor loadings for 
Madagascar and Tanzania are equally high, but both move in the opposite direction 
compared to Botswana. The three countries’ central bank rates are estimated, but the results 
produced two significant PCs, with one dominated by Botswana and the other by 
Madagascar and Tanzania. Hence, it is apparent that Botswana is not in same group as the 
other two countries. Estimation for the two countries results in one significant PC explaining 
80% of the variations in rates. An outlier is Zimbabwe whose factor loading dominates the 
fourth PC of the full sample. Overall with regards to the central bank rates, we can identify 
five groups of countries that tend to move in different directions. The dominant group, 
Group 1 comprises the CMA countries plus Angola, Malawi and Seychelles. Group 2 
comprises Madagascar and Tanzania, while the other three countries, Botswana, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, are largely independent.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 In the case of deposit rates reported in Panel B, the results show that there are four 
significant PCs for the 14 countries in the sample. Following the same procedure as for 
central bank rates, we identify five groups of countries moving in different directions. In 
Group 1 there are seven countries, including the SACU members plus Seychelles and 
Zambia. Angola seems to move closely with Group 1 as it does not have a high factor 
loading outside the first PC. However, when Angola is included in Group 1, two significant 
PCs are found. Group 2 comprises Madagascar and Tanzania with the first PC explaining 
75% of the variations in their deposit rates. Group 3 includes Malawi and Mozambique. The 
factor loadings for Mauritius and Zimbabwe dominate the fourth PC of the full sample and 
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they appear to move together. However, the results of their combined group indicate almost 
two significant PCs with the second PC explaining 41% of the variations in their deposit 
rates. A plot of their interest rate series also does not show any meaningful co-movement. As 
noted by Jolliffe (2002), it is unwise to group such countries together and we therefore treat 
Malawi and Mozambique as independent. 
 The results of the PCA for lending rates for 14 countries are reported in Panel C. 
The PCA detects three significant PCs accounting for 85% of the variations in the lending 
rates. The iterative analysis suggests also five groups of countries that move differently. The 
first group comprises of eight countries, which are the CMA members and Angola, Malawi, 
Seychelles and Zambia. In group 2 we have Botswana, and Mozambique, while group 3 
comprises of Madagascar and Tanzania.  Lastly, Mauritius and Zimbabwe are individually 
independent.  
 In summary, the convergence-group analyses suggest that some countries are 
showing signs of convergence with the CMA countries towards the end of our sample period 
(see Table 4). Prominent among them is Seychelles which converges in all three markets. 
Angola, Malawi and Zambia show convergence in two out of the three markets. In 
Botswana, convergence only occurs in the retail deposit market. A number of countries such 
as Madagascar, Mozambique and Tanzania seem to be moving together in pairs, but not with 
the CMA countries. Lastly, a few countries behave independently of the others. Notable 
among them are Zimbabwe and Mauritius. The central bank rates in Botswana and Zambia 
also behave in that fashion.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
4.2. Driving forces of integration: Evidence from pass-through analysis 
An efficient and homogeneous PT from central bank rates onto retail banking rates 
can create the equivalent of an integrated banking market under the condition of a monetary 
integration that has already tied together policy-determined interest rates. Monetary 
integration is, however, neither sufficient nor necessary for banking market integration. It is 
not sufficient if the PT remains heterogeneous across countries because of special national 
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characteristics of the banking systems and a lack of cross-border arbitrage. On the other 
hand, monetary integration may not be necessary for banking market integration as it has 
become clear from the previous PCA for the convergence club during 2000-2005. In some 
cases, banking markets in fact lead rather than lag integration. In these cases an indirect PT 
from foreign central bank rates to national retail rates may exist via the foreign retail rates. 
Next to the national PT we therefore also investigate the PT from South African central bank 
rates to national retail rates. 
 We conduct rolling PT analysis for all SADC countries from 1990 to 2005 using the 
same five-year windows as for the PCA. Figure 3 summarizes our findings for the national 
PT by showing the average long-run multipliers and their variation in SADC and the sub-
regions.14 Our results show that the PT onto deposit rates is generally less than perfect with 
the long-run multiplier dropping substantially below the full PT value of 1 to a level below 
0.6. Remarkably, this is not a single phenomenon in some groups but happens in all 
subgroups of the SADC countries. Consequently, the coefficient of variation remains rather 
stable over the investigated period, suggesting that the PT-heterogeneity within both SADC 
and the subgroups does not change much over time. The only exemptions are the OTHER 
countries. Here we find episodes of increased heterogeneity in the mid-1990s and early 
2000s, suggesting a sensitivity of the PT to changes in the macroeconomic and regulatory 
environment. With respect to the short-run multiplier or the “speed” of the PT (not shown in 
Figure 3) it is interesting to note that these long-run values of the average multipliers are 
almost reached after three months. However, the 3-months multipliers show a slightly higher 
variability across countries. The reduction in the PT, in an advanced economy regularly 
interpreted as a signal of market imperfections, is in the SADC context predominantly linked 
to financial deregulation with respect to interest rates. In fact, by European standards a long-
term PT of 0.6 for deposit rates is quite high. But it should also be noted that high inflation 
(at least above a certain threshold) typically leads to a high PT. With respect to loan rates we 
also find (partly for similar reasons) a reduction in the long-run average PT below the full 
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PT-benchmark of 1. Here, however, we clearly document a strong difference between CMA 
and SACU on the one hand, and the OTHER countries on the other hand. The former groups 
exhibit a still strong PT with South Africa often having a full PT, while in the latter group 
the PT is rather limited with an average long-run multiplier of close to 0.4 which may 
indicate serious banking market imperfections. Consequently, CMA and SACU have a much 
more homogenous PT than the others, although the heterogeneity increased somewhat 
during the later periods across all SADC countries. 
 [Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 In order to test for PT-differences between CMA, SACU and OTHER we adopt a 
simple dummy regression approach. We regress the multipliers of different time horizons on 
a CMA and a Botswana dummy and use additional time dummies for the rolling time 
periods (with the rolling period 2001-2005 as benchmark). These regressions are reported in 
Table 5 and reveal that the lending rate PT is significantly faster (between 0.24 and 0.35 
points) and more complete (plus 0.24) in the CMA countries than in the OTHER countries. 
In Botswana the PT is only faster (up to 0.22 points) but not more complete. Moreover, the 
impression of a more efficient PT in the second half of the 1990s that can be interfered from 
Figure 3 is confirmed by the regression. With respect to deposit rates the PT in the CMA is 
speedier but not more complete. No significant effects are found for Botswana – at least at a 
5% confidence level or higher.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 To highlight the drivers of banking market integration we concentrate in the 
following on the PT of those countries identified by the PCA in Table 4 as Group 1. As 
expected, all four CMA members belong to this convergence group and exhibit not only a 
fast but also (almost) perfect PT in lending rates. This PT is furthermore heavily influenced 
by South African central bank rates. We therefore conduct an additional PT analysis with 
respect to South Africa rates. The long-run multipliers for Group 1 are shown in Figure 4.15 
                                                                                                                                          
14 For specific national multipliers see Table A-3 in the working paper version. 
15 For specific national multipliers see Table A-4 in the working paper version. 
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The long run PT in the most recent period of investigation in Namibia is 0.8 for the national 
policy rate and 0.72 for the South African policy rate. In Swaziland, the values are 0.93 and 
0.86, respectively, while lending rates in Lesotho are directly and exclusively responding to 
South African rates, possibly a consequence of the financial distress in this country 
described earlier. With respect to deposit rates the situation is similar. The highest long-term 
PT is found in South Africa (0.86). In the other CMA countries the PT from national rates is 
only marginally faster than the PT from South African policy rates (Namibia: 0.43 versus 
0.38, Swaziland 0.74 versus 0.74, and Lesotho is again mainly responding to the South 
African rate with a PT coefficient of 0.24). In sum, it appears that banking market 
integration is following monetary integration. Thus, South African monetary policy plays a 
dominant role in banking market behaviour.16 The PT evidence is therefore fully in line with 
the PC evidence that groups all CMA countries into one convergence group for all three 
interest rates. The PT also finds more evidence for integration in lending rather than deposit 
markets, particularly for Namibia. This finding is again in line with the PC results which 
found least convergence in deposits.  
At the other extreme we have Botswana and Zambia who also belong to Group 1 but 
appear to be driven by banking market integration only. This process can be completely 
mediated through banking market arbitrage and is as such been detect by the PCA. 
Potentially, capital account convertibility in both countries drives these developments. Given 
the fast and (almost) complete PT in South Africa, the national banking rates should then 
also exhibit a statistical relationship with South African policy rates. In fact, Zambia’s 
deposit and lending rates are increasingly related to South African central bank rates as is 
Botswana’s deposit rate, though at a very low level.  
 In the remaining countries of the convergence Group 1 we find both monetary and 
(some) banking market integration. The Seychelles are the only non-CMA member of the 
Group 1 convergence club with respect to all three interest rates. As such, both an efficient 
                                                 
16 These findings for CMA countries are also robust when allowing for asymmetric and threshold 
adjustment of retail rates as reported by Sander and Kleimeier (2006). 
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national PT as well as a link to South African rates may be important. In fact, the 
Seychelles’ lending rate is responding to the national central bank rate, as can be seen from a 
(small) long-run multiplier of 0.54 in the most recent rolling period, but is also cointegrated 
with the South African policy rate with a most recent long-run multiplier of 0.19. The long-
run responses of the deposit rate to national and South African policy rates are in a similar 
range with multiplier values of 0.57 and 0.19, respectively. Angola and Malawi are in Group 
1 with respect to central bank rate and lending rates. In fact, we find their lending rates to be 
cointegrated with the South African policy rate while deposit rates are not consistently 
cointegrated over time. The (too) high multipliers are however difficult to interpret and may 
reflect the fact that national policy rates that still largely diverge from the South African 
ones. 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 In sum, banking market integration can be both a genuine process and/or driven by 
monetary integration. However, especially banking-market driven integration needs capital 
account convertibility. This is not needed with monetary integration in conjunction with an 
efficient and homogenous PT. Moreover, the latter approach has shown its ability to improve 
the efficiency of national banking markets in terms of a faster and more complete PT. From 
a policy perspective, however, a strong competition policy is needed whenever cross-border 
banking is limited, be it for regulatory or economic reasons. 
 
5. Integration and monetary policy efficiency: Policy implications for an expansion of CMA 
 The PCA allows us to identify a convergence club within SADC. A first group 
within this convergence club consists of the CMA countries. They exhibit monetary 
integration and banking integration in loan and deposit markets. Clearly, here the monetary 
policy rates are dominated by South Africa. Moreover, as the PT is quite efficient in these 
countries, banking rates are also integrated. Consequently, the lending and deposit rates 
respond in a very similar way to changes in both, the domestic and the South African central 
bank rate. For example, the long run multiplier for loans in Namibia with respect to the 
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domestic policy rate is 0.80 and with respect to the South African rate it is 0.72. The 
corresponding responses in Swaziland are 0.93 and 0.86, respectively. The respective long-
run multipliers for deposits in Namibia are 0.43 and 0.38, and 0.74 with respect to both 
policy rates in Swaziland. 
 A second group comprises non CMA-countries with monetary and banking 
integration in loan and deposit markets. Again the banking market integration appears to be 
mediated through the South African monetary policy rate as we find the Seychelles’ deposit 
and lending rates to be cointegrated with the South African monetary policy rate. However, 
the long-run PT from South Africa is here only 0.20 for both rates. Also Angola’s and 
Malawi’s lending rates are cointegrated with the South African Policy rate but the long run 
multipliers are implausibly high. 
 Finally there are non-CMA countries with only banking market integration and no 
monetary integration, such as Botswana where we find for the deposit rate and – very 
recently – for the lending rate some evidence for cointegration with the South African 
central bank rate, but only at a very low level. In a similar vein, Zambian deposit and lending 
rates are related to the South African central bank rate, but also at a very low level and the 
evidence for cointegration is weak. 
 In sum, we find the CMA countries ready for further integration when judged from 
the point of view of financial integration only. Additionally, the Seychelles show a good 
potential for joining CMA and their further deepening towards a monetary union. In fact, the 
Seychelles have a high financial development with respect to deposit and low interest rate 
spreads. They do, however, still have an underdeveloped credit market both in absolute 
terms and in relative terms in relation to CMA. Zambia and Botswana are also potential 
candidates for a CMA expansion17 as there is already some integration evidence for banking 
markets. These two countries orient themselves to some extent at South African policy rates, 
                                                 
17 Buigut and Valev (2006) also favour these two countries. 
 
 
 26
but low levels of financial development and efficiency require particular attention of 
financial development and competition policies. This applies even more to Angola and 
Malawi who both show some signs of integration combined with even worse financial 
development and financial efficiency indicators. For the remaining countries, financial 
integration indicators do not yet point to a readiness for CMA membership. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 Monetary and financial integration is high on the agenda of SADC’s policy makers 
and has received increasing attention in the academic literature. We investigate the state, 
development and drivers of banking market integration in SADC member countries by 
employing interest rate data. Banking market integration can be a market-determined process 
and/or driven by monetary integration. We find evidence for increasing monetary integration 
and banking integration in loan and deposit markets. Integration is, however, not developing 
uniformly but concentrated in only a few countries. In particular, being a member of a 
currency area like CMA is found not only to promote banking market integration but also 
banking market efficiency in term of a faster and more complete PT. But this banking 
market integration is clearly driven by monetary integration and as such dominated be the 
largest CMA economy, South Africa. Nevertheless, some other countries have recently been 
able to join to this convergence club. Some of them are increasingly integrating themselves 
with these countries in terms of both, money and banking markets, while other countries are 
integrating only with respect to their banking markets. We therefore conclude that a selective 
and cautionary expansion of CMA is possible. Seychelles, Zambia and Botswana are 
potential first candidates. Such an expansion, however, requires not only more policy 
coordination and nominal convergence but financial market imperfections need also to be 
addressed. When putting monetary and financial integration high on SADCs policy agenda, 
policy makers will thus also have to turn financial development policies into a central part of 
their integration vision. 
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Figure 1: The development of central bank and retail interest rates in Southern Africa
Panel A: CMA
Panel B: SACU
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Figure 1 continued: The development of central bank and retail interest rates in Southern Africa
Panel C: OTHER
Panel D: SADC
Notes: The regional groups comprise the following countries: CMA = Lesotho, Namibia, South
Africa, Swaziland; SACU = all CMA countries and Botswana; OTHER = Angola, DR Congo,
Madagaska, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe; SADC =
all OTHER and SACU countries. The coefficient of variation is defined as the standard deviation
divided by the average of all interest rates in the region.
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Figure 2: Eigenvalues as an indicator of integration
Panel A: Bank rates
Panel B: Deposit rates
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Figure 2 continued: Eigenvalues as an indicator of integration
Panel C: Lending rates
Notes: For the country-composition of the regions, see notes to Figure 1.
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Figure 3: The pass-through of national bank rates to national deposit and lending rates
Panel A: Deposit rates
Panel B: Lending rates
Notes: For the country-composition of the regions, see notes to Figure 1.
Average long-run multiplier in region
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1
9
9
0
-
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
1
-
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
2
-
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
3
-
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
4
-
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
5
-
1
9
9
9
1
9
9
6
-
2
0
0
0
1
9
9
7
-
2
0
0
1
1
9
9
8
-
2
0
0
2
1
9
9
9
-
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
0
-
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
1
-
2
0
0
5
CMA SACU OTHER SADC
Average long-run multiplier in region
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1
9
9
0
-
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
1
-
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
2
-
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
3
-
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
4
-
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
5
-
1
9
9
9
1
9
9
6
-
2
0
0
0
1
9
9
7
-
2
0
0
1
1
9
9
8
-
2
0
0
2
1
9
9
9
-
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
0
-
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
1
-
2
0
0
5
Coefficient of variation of long-run multipliers in region
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1
9
9
0
-
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
1
-
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
2
-
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
3
-
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
4
-
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
5
-
1
9
9
9
1
9
9
6
-
2
0
0
0
1
9
9
7
-
2
0
0
1
1
9
9
8
-
2
0
0
2
1
9
9
9
-
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
0
-
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
1
-
2
0
0
5
Coefficient of variation of long-run multipliers in region
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1
9
9
0
-
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
1
-
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
2
-
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
3
-
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
4
-
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
5
-
1
9
9
9
1
9
9
6
-
2
0
0
0
1
9
9
7
-
2
0
0
1
1
9
9
8
-
2
0
0
2
1
9
9
9
-
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
0
-
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
1
-
2
0
0
5
 
 37
Figure 4: The role of the South African central bank rate for national retail rates
Panel A: Deposit rates
Panel B: Lending rates
Note: For the country-composition of the regions, see notes to Figure 1.
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Table 1: Economic conditions and financial development
Lesotho Namibia
South 
Africa
Swazi- 
land CMU Botswana SACU Angola
Mada- 
gascar Malawi Mauritius
Mozam- 
bique
Sey- 
chelles Tanzania Zambia
Zim-
babwe OTHERS SADC
Panel A: Average annual real GDP growth
1990 to 1994 4.4% 4.4% 0.2% 3.9% 0.4% 4.4% 0.6% -5.9% 0.0% 1.3% 5.3% 4.4% 4.5% 2.5% -0.8% 2.8% 1.6% 0.9%
1995 to 1999 3.6% 3.6% 2.6% 3.7% 2.6% 8.0% 2.8% 7.9% 3.2% 6.9% 4.9% 3.4% 3.8% 1.5% 2.5% 3.7% 3.1%
2000 to 2005 2.6% 4.6% 3.9% 1.9% 3.9% 5.3% 3.9% 9.3% 2.9% 2.6% 4.2% 1.2% 6.5% 4.6% -6.1% 1.9% 3.4%
Panel B: Average annual inflation rate
1990 to 1994 13.6% 12.2% 12.4% 11.1% 12.4% 12.8% 12.4% 677.7% 16.8% 21.1% 8.6% 46.2% 2.5% 29.0% 121.7% 26.5% 115.0% 42.1%
1995 to 1999 8.1% 8.3% 7.3% 8.0% 7.4% 8.7% 7.4% 1478.3% 17.9% 40.9% 6.6% 22.9% 1.6% 17.2% 30.7% 30.6% 210.1% 66.1%
2000 to 2005 7.6% 7.2% 5.1% 7.6% 5.3% 8.0% 5.4% 126.1% 11.0% 17.2% 4.9% 12.0% 3.4% 4.0% 21.2% 90.9% 45.2% 16.9%
Panel C: Average annual spread between lending and deposit rate
1990 to 1994 7.1% 8.9% 3.9% 6.0% 4.1% 1.7% 4.0% 5.8% 7.1% 6.8% 6.3% 14.5% 16.3% 2.1% 5.7% 4.5%
1995 to 1999 6.8% 7.5% 4.9% 7.4% 5.0% 4.7% 5.0% 42.3% 15.8% 15.3% 9.6% 14.5% 6.5% 17.2% 17.1% 12.2% 17.7% 8.7%
2000 to 2005 10.4% 6.2% 4.9% 7.0% 5.0% 6.0% 5.0% 58.6% 11.9% 22.1% 12.0% 10.4% 6.5% 12.4% 19.7% 73.7% 34.5% 13.6%
Panel D: Average annual credit to GDP
1990 to 1994 17.8% 33.0% 44.5% 23.1% 43.4% 13.6% 42.5% 16.3% 10.9% 38.5% 12.5% 7.9% 11.6% 6.2% 17.4% 14.8% 34.5%
1995 to 1999 17.6% 46.9% 64.1% 16.5% 62.0% 12.5% 60.5% 3.9% 9.7% 4.9% 50.8% 13.0% 13.4% 4.5% 7.6% 23.1% 16.2% 47.7%
2000 to 2005 10.2% 47.9% 67.3% 14.8% 64.9% 18.4% 63.5% 4.4% 9.0% 5.9% 64.1% 13.0% 24.0% 7.0% 7.0% 20.3% 17.5% 50.2%
Panel E: Average annual deposits to GDP
1990 to 1994 33.6% 31.1% 47.1% 27.8% 46.1% 19.4% 45.3% 15.2% 16.4% 61.4% 21.3% 42.5% 15.3% 14.6% 17.6% 20.1% 38.0%
1995 to 1999 30.7% 42.0% 51.0% 23.1% 49.8% 23.7% 49.0% 16.0% 13.9% 12.9% 71.2% 18.3% 73.3% 14.3% 14.9% 21.8% 23.7% 41.7%
2000 to 2005 24.7% 39.9% 53.7% 18.9% 52.2% 27.1% 51.4% 14.9% 15.5% 15.7% 81.5% 24.5% 95.8% 17.0% 18.5% 30.0% 28.7% 44.8%
Notes regarding data source: Datastream. Real GDP growth is obtained from The Economist year-on-year change in real GDP series (DGDP..). For Lesotho, Madagascar, Seychelles and Swaziland these series are missing and
the IFS line 99 data is used instead. Inflation is based on CPI from IFS line 64. credit to GDP is calculated as IFS line 22d in percent of nominal GDP (line 99B..A). Correspondingly deposits to GDP are calculated as IFS line
24 plus 25 in percent of nominal GDP. Note that observations for some countries and years are missing. The regional averages are weighted averages of the national data. Weights are own calculations based on real GDP
measured in international dollars in the year 2000 obtained from Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the
University of Pennsylvania, September 2006.  
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Table 2: The explanatory power of the first principle component
Period CMA SACU OTHER SADC
Panel A: Bank rates
1990-1994 0.841 0.706 0.637 0.635
1991-1995 0.792 0.705 0.656 0.492
1992-1996 0.840 0.721 0.554 0.462
1993-1997 0.928 0.831 0.461 0.472
1994-1998 0.912 0.787 0.565 0.532
1995-1999 0.692 0.610 0.547 0.448
1996-2000 0.717 0.680 0.456 0.450
1997-2001 0.798 0.767 0.535 0.578
1998-2002 0.838 0.773 0.534 0.560
1999-2003 0.838 0.688 0.393 0.399
2000-2004 0.847 0.710 0.565 0.526
2001-2005 0.825 0.862 0.750 0.702
Average 0.822 0.737 0.554 0.521
Panel B: Deposit rate
1990-1994 0.807 0.680 0.620 0.635
1991-1995 0.866 0.706 0.386 0.476
1992-1996 0.866 0.746 0.418 0.456
1993-1997 0.881 0.806 0.343 0.490
1994-1998 0.784 0.706 0.437 0.435
1995-1999 0.735 0.599 0.474 0.385
1996-2000 0.919 0.744 0.442 0.710
1997-2001 0.955 0.847 0.399 0.465
1998-2002 0.946 0.867 0.459 0.563
1999-2003 0.901 0.746 0.350 0.386
2000-2004 0.874 0.736 0.484 0.457
2001-2005 0.863 0.798 0.632 0.606
Average 0.866 0.748 0.454 0.505
Panel C: Lending rate
1990-1994 0.767 0.694 0.611 0.627
1991-1995 0.784 0.732 0.574 0.518
1992-1996 0.773 0.620 0.590 0.429
1993-1997 0.859 0.688 0.487 0.419
1994-1998 0.924 0.740 0.420 0.480
1995-1999 0.839 0.695 0.497 0.397
1996-2000 0.854 0.786 0.495 0.434
1997-2001 0.903 0.854 0.530 0.574
1998-2002 0.920 0.841 0.463 0.538
1999-2003 0.896 0.746 0.480 0.479
2000-2004 0.894 0.773 0.506 0.518
2001-2005 0.939 0.864 0.549 0.614
Average 0.863 0.753 0.517 0.502
Cumulative R2 of the first principle component
Notes: For the country-composition of the regions, see notes to
Figure 1.  
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Full 
sample Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5
Full 
sample Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5
Panel A: Bank rate
Eigenvalue
PC#1 7.357 5.532 1.604 na na na 7.727 4.81 1.506 1.516 na na
PC#2 1.798 0.772 0.396 na na na 2.106 0.842 0.494 0.484 na na
PC#3 1.152 na na na na na 1.316 0.664 na na na na
PC#4 0.663 na na na na na 1.031 na na na na na
Cumulative R 2
PC#1 0.613 0.791 0.802 na na na 0.552 0.687 0.753 0.758 na na
PC#2 0.763 0.901 1.000 na na na 0.702 0.807 1 1 na na
PC#3 0.859 na na na na na 0.796 0.902 na na na na
PC#4 0.914 na na na na na 0.871 na na na na na
Factor loading of vector 1
Angola -0.329 -0.358 -0.282 -0.282
Botswana -0.129 0.512 -0.237 -0.296
Lesotho -0.205 -0.289 -0.263 -0.368
Madagascar 0.219 0.707 0.201 0.707
Malawi -0.303 -0.351 -0.284 0.707
Mauritius -0.246 -0.587
Mozambique -0.296 0.707
Namibia -0.348 -0.413 -0.249 -0.375
Seychelles -0.351 -0.414 -0.341 -0.301
South Africa -0.344 -0.401 -0.254 -0.444
Swaziland -0.346 -0.403 -0.323 -0.443
Tanzania 0.223 0.707 0.066 0.707
Zambia -0.296 0.416 -0.336 -0.401
Zimbabwe 0.272 -0.649 0.252 -0.455
Table 3: Principal components analysis of convergence groups among SADC countries for 2000 to 2005
Panel B: Deposit rate
Convergence groupsConvergence groups
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Full 
sample Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5
Panel C: Lending rate
Eigenvalue
PC#1 7.999 6.683 1.685 1.691 na na
PC#2 2.826 0.569 0.316 0.309 na na
PC#3 1.028 0.352 na na
PC#4 0.827 na na
Cumulative R 2
PC#1 0.571 0.835 0.842 0.846 na na
PC#2 0.773 0.907 1.000 1.000 na na
PC#3 0.847 0.951 na na na na
PC#4 0.906 na na na na na
Factor loading of vector 1
Angola -0.278 -0.312
Botswana -0.112 0.707
Lesotho -0.349 -0.379
Madagascar -0.039 0.707
Malawi -0.319 -0.352
Mauritius 0.029 0.933
Mozambique -0.156 0.707
Namibia -0.329 -0.364
Seychelles -0.328 -0.358
South Africa -0.335 -0.371
Swaziland -0.321 -0.351
Tanzania -0.203 0.707
Zambia -0.312 -0.338
Zimbabwe 0.301 0.301
Table 3 continued: Principal components analysis of convergence groups among SADC
countries for 2000 to 2005
Notes: na denotes not applicable. Bank rate was not available for DR Congo, Mauritius
and Mozambique. Deposit and Lending rates were not available for DR Congo.
Convergence groups
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Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Angola BL D
Botswana D L B
Lesotho BDL
Madagascar BDL
Malawi BL D
Mauritius DL
Mozambique DL
Namibia BDL
Seychelles BDL
South Africa BDL
Swaziland BDL
Tanzania BDL
Zambia DL B
Zimbabwe BDL
Table 4: Principal components analysis of
convergence groups among SADC countries from
2000 to 2005
Notes: B - Bank rate, D - Deposit rate and L -
Lending rate; Group 2- Pair of countries move
together and Group 3- Each country is independent.
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Table 5: Region and time patterns in the national pass-through in SADC banking markets
Independent variable Impact 1 month
3 
months
6 
months 
12 
months long-run Impact 1 month
3 
months
6 
months 
12 
months long-run
Panel A: Loan rates Panel B: Deposit rates
Intercept 0.25 0.31 0.38 0.43 0.46 0.48 0.21 0.25 0.32 0.36 0.40 0.42
2.43 3.23 3.92 4.40 4.63 4.71 2.17 2.42 3.02 3.39 3.57 3.66
Regional dummies:
CMA 0.23 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.28 0.24 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.10
3.46 5.75 5.41 4.94 4.41 3.71 3.23 3.22 2.80 2.25 1.73 1.36
Botswana 0.05 0.13 0.21 0.22 0.19 0.15 -0.17 -0.08 0.00 0.07 0.12 0.15
0.47 1.29 1.97 2.02 1.78 1.39 -1.70 -0.72 0.03 0.62 1.02 1.19
Time dummies:
1990-1994 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.16 0.20 0.22 0.31 0.40 0.46 0.51
0.06 0.19 0.33 0.54 0.84 1.01 1.33 1.36 1.89 2.36 2.62 2.77
1991-1995 0.05 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.18
0.30 0.80 0.93 1.01 1.11 1.20 0.41 0.47 0.64 0.79 0.92 1.04
1992-1996 0.05 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.19
0.34 0.87 0.89 0.96 1.15 1.29 0.58 0.49 0.55 0.72 0.91 1.17
1993-1997 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.05 0.11 0.17 0.23 0.28 0.31
0.85 1.14 1.11 1.00 0.98 1.03 0.34 0.77 1.12 1.48 1.74 1.89
1994-1998 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.24 0.03 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16
0.92 1.22 1.31 1.37 1.47 1.72 0.25 0.73 0.87 0.97 0.99 1.00
1995-1999 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
1.96 1.93 1.78 1.78 1.90 1.99 1.05 1.31 1.28 1.28 1.22 1.14
1996-2000 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.14 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.22
1.65 1.80 1.79 1.70 1.75 1.86 1.06 1.28 1.38 1.46 1.44 1.40
1997-2001 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.03 0.08 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.17
0.58 0.97 1.00 0.88 0.86 0.93 0.25 0.60 0.89 1.07 1.11 1.06
1998-2002 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.13 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03
0.35 0.47 0.56 0.50 0.53 0.95 -0.15 0.12 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.18
1999-2003 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08
0.27 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.38 0.46 0.82 0.72 0.59 0.55 0.51
2000-2004 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
-0.29 -0.18 -0.06 -0.10 -0.14 -0.14 -0.15 -0.04 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.01
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
Dependent variable: Multiplier for a +1% shock Dependent variable: Multiplier for a +1% shock
Notes: All independent variables are dummies. For each independent variable, the first row reports the estimated coefficient and the
second row reports the t-statistics in italics. In Panels A and B, the regressions are based on samples of 147 and 143 observations,
respectively. Multipliers for all SADC countries are included. The time period 2001-2005 serves as a benchmark for the time dummies.
 44 
Table A-1: Summary of exchange rate systems, exchange control restrictions on current and capital account transactions in the SADC countries
Country Exchange rate system Exchange control on current account transactions Restrictions on capital account transactions
Angola Free floating exchange rate system. Almost all current account transactions have been
liberalised.
Inward investment is prohibited in some strategic
sectors as defense and security. Capital repatriation
upon liquidation is subject to prior approval of the
Minister of Finance. Annual transfers of dividends
are subject to approval by BNA. All capital transfers
are subject to licensing and control. 
Botswana The currency is pegged to a weighted basket of
currencies comprising SDR currencies and the South
African Rand.
Exchange control was abolished effective February
8, 1999.
Full capital account convertibility since February
1999.
- Foreign investment by private individuals outside
the CMA up to M250,000.00.
- Opening of foreign currency and offshore accounts
for private individuals is limited to M250,000.00.
- Direct investment by corporate / companies to
countries outside the CMA is allowed up to M50
million within the SADC region and up to M30
million elsewhere.
- No restriction on long-term capital inflows.
Madagascar Independently floating (but IMF notes that the
regime operating de facto in the country is different
from its de jure regime).
Malawi Managed floating with no pre-determined path for
the exchange rate.
Mauritius Managed floating with no preannounced path for
exchange rate.
Mauritius has adopted Article VIII, section 2, 3 and
4, of the IMF Articles of Agreement with effect from
September 1993.
There are no restrictions on capital account
transactions in respect of both inward and outward
investments.
No restrictions on capital accounts within CMA.
Limited reforms on capital account since June 27, 
Lesotho Fixed exchange rate regime (Pegged at par with the
South African Rand –CMA).
Lesotho acceded to Article VIII status under the IMF
Articles of Agreement. Hence no controls on current
account transactions.
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Table A-1 continued: Summary of exchange rate systems, exchange control restrictions on current and capital account transactions in the SADC countries
Mozambique Free floating system. No restrictions are imposed on the exports of goods.
The import of goods must be preceded by
negotiation of foreign currency with commercial
banks. There are no restrictions on the entry of
earnings for services. Payments for services
exceeding a value equivalent to US$5 000.00 must
be licensed by the central bank.
Non-residents and traveler can import any amount of
foreign currency against declaration. Only the
foreign currency previously declared may be
exported. Foreigners are allowed to invest in
Mozambique. Expatriation of profits and invested
capital are also allowed and regulated by the law. 
Seychelles Conventional fixed peg arrangements against a single
currency (but IMF notes that the regime operating de
facto in the country is different from its de jure 
No restrictions on inward investment and
disinvestment by non-residents. 
There are controls on outward capital investment.
Swaziland Fixed exchange rate system – pegged at par with the
South African Rand.
Same as South Africa. Same as South Africa.
Tanzania Managed floating exchange rate system. No restrictions on current account transactions in line 
with IMF’s Article VIII since 1996.
The capital account is not fully liberalised.
Zambia Fully market determined. The is no exchange control on current account. The are no exchange controls on capital account.
Zimbabwe Foreign currency Auction System- since January
2004.
There are some exchange controls on current account
transaction due to critical shortage of foreign
currency – even though Zimbabwe has ratified the
Article VIII of the IMF.
The are exchange controls on capital account.
Source: IMF Exchange Rate Arrangements and Restrictions, Annual Reports, various isues.
South Africa Free floating system. No restrictions on current account transactions.
No capital account restriction within CMA.No
restriction on capital from non-residents for equity
investment. Outward investments limit for corporate
business is N$750 million. 
Namibia Fixed exchange rate system – pegged at par with the
South African Rand.
There are no restrictions on current account Namibia
acceded to Article VIII of the IMF in 1996.
 
